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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress enacted "a comprehensive scheme prohibiting
the employment of illegal aliens in the United States."' Recently,
many municipalities have taken matters into their own hands because
of dissatisfaction over federal enforcement of these employment regu-
lations.2 Municipalities across the country have enacted, or consid-
ered enacting, ordinances that penalize employers of unauthorized
workers as well as property owners who lease property to undocu-
mented immigrants. 3 These ordinances have led to a conflict between
federal authority, which traditionally regulates immigration, and local
authority, which traditionally regulates employment and housing.
Although advocates of local regulations claim that they are
merely assisting the federal government in enforcing immigration
laws, detractors view these regulations as discriminatory measures
against immigrants and minority residents. Many advocates of local
regulation support their efforts with generalized allegations of the
harm that undocumented immigrants cause without providing any sta-
tistical proof of their claims. 4 Although public officials supporting lo-
cal ordinances usually couch their terminology to target only
undocumented immigrants, this facade occasionally slips. The mayor
of Valley Park, Missouri, for example, justified local employer sanc-
I Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
2 See Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, with No Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2006, at A34 (suggesting that "frustration with the federal government's lack of
immigration enforcement" might cause restrictive local regulations); Julia Preston, Judge
Voids Ordinances on Illegal Immigrants: Says Restrictions Violated Due Process, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2007, at A14 (quoting Hazleton's mayor as saying "I will not sit back because the federal
government has refused to do its job.").
3 See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.
aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund
Filed in Support of Defendant-Appellant for Reversal of the Judgment Below at 3, Lozano
v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.aclupa.
org/downloads/EagleFmamicusHz.pdf ("Raised in a vastly different culture and often una-
ble to communicate with their new neighbors, it is not surprising that illegal aliens commit
crimes that shock local residents and threaten their way of life."). Eagle Forum also asserts
that undocumented immigrants commit crimes that not "even the worst of American
criminals.., would commit." Id. at 4. Eagle Forum, however, provides no support for the
broad generalization that no American would commit such heinous crimes. Furthermore,
these arguments raised against undocumented immigrants, premised in part on their be-
ing raised in a different culture, would seem to apply equally to lawful immigrants.
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tions by expressing concern about "Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco
Whoever" coming to town.5
To support the proposition that these ordinances are purely dis-
criminatory in intent, individuals opposed to such measures portray
them as the latest manifestation of a long wave of anti-immigrant mea-
sures and sentiments expressed throughout U.S. history.6 Although
the times have changed, the rhetoric is familiar. In the eighteenth
century, Benjamin Franklin called German immigrants "the most ig-
norant Stupid Sort of their own Nation"; he assumed that "[flew of
their children in the Country learn English," and he feared that unless
their immigration was stopped "they will soon so out number us,
that.., even our Government will become precarious. '7 In the nine-
teenth century, there was a backlash against Roman Catholic and Chi-
nese immigrants.8 The twentieth century witnessed the internment of
Japanese-Americans as well as limited opportunities for Jewish immi-
gration immediately before the Holocaust. 9 Now, local communities
have enacted ordinances aimed at keeping out "illegal immigrants"
that also have the effect of creating an atmosphere of harassment and
intimidation for lawful immigrants and minority residents.' 0
Opponents of local regulations, however, cannot dismiss the mea-
sures as purely discriminatory: local governments' concerns over the
failure of federal immigration enforcement are justified. Since 1986,
federal employer sanctions have failed to stem the tide of illegal immi-
5 See Rigel Oliveri, Editorial, Valley Park Needs To Shut Down Its War on Immigrants, ST.
Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 2007, at B7, LexisNexis Academic. These statements express
a naked racial bias: Puerto Ricans are, of course, U.S. citizens at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1402
(2006).
6 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Interfaith Groups in Support of Appellees and
Urging Affirmance at 16-27, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Apr. 17,
2008), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/InterfaithAmicus.pdf (summarizing
the history of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States from the 1700s to the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
7 The Support of the Poor, Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson (May 9,
1753), available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document
=472.
8 See THOMs ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 162 (6th ed. 2008) (noting that anti-Catholic sentiments arose from a view that
"Catholics... [were] unable to become good citizens-that is, independent and self-reli-
ant-since they were subject to orders from the church"); infra notes 23-26 and accompa-
nying text (discussing anti-Chinese legislation and litigation challenging it).
9 See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (limiting immigration by use of a
national-origin quota system); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) ("[Mil-
itary authorities] decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily"); Brief of
Interfaith Groups, supra note 6, at 23 (discussing restrictions on Jewish immigration into
the U.S. prior to the outbreak of World War II).
10 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 508-10 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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gration.11 Further, although policy makers generally believe that tax
revenues received from unauthorized immigrants exceed their use of
government services in the aggregate, research indicates that local
and state governments spend more on services for unauthorized im-
migrants than they receive from those immigrants in state and local
tax revenue. 1
2
There are no easy solutions to these conflicts, and litigation about
a local government's ability to combat the presence of undocumented
immigrants is currently ongoing. Courts have disagreed over whether
employer and housing sanctions are valid. The federal statutory provi-
sion that preempts local ordinances regulating employment of unau-
thorized workers creates an exemption for "licensing and similar laws"
in a savings clause.' 3 To define "licensing and similar laws," courts
have nothing to turn to but an ambiguous legislative history.1 4 In ad-
dition to disputing the proper scope of the savings clause, courts and
litigants have disputed the ways in which a local ordinance might con-
flict with federal immigration laws and policies. Moreover, legislators
have provided no statutory guidance to courts analyzing the validity of
housing ordinances.
Courts (so far) have responded by using the preemption doctrine
to reach a desired result rather than conducting a principle-based
analysis of the validity of local laws that impose a licensing penalty on
employers of unauthorized workers. Where one court found local
laws preempted, it did so using every preemption theory available.'
5
Likewise, where another court held that an ordinance was valid, the
court interpreted the ordinance creatively to find that it did not con-
11 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PuB. No. 2500, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMI-
GRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3-4 (2007), available at http:/
/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-Immigration.pdf (noting that the Department
of Homeland Security estimated that 11.6 million unauthorized immigrants were present
in the United States in January 2006).
12 See id. at 1.
13 Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 274A(h) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2)
(2006). For the text of the statute, see infra note 33.
14 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662
("The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically preempt any state
or local laws providing civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or
referral of undocumented aliens. They are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful
state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a li-
cense to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this
legislation. Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or 'fitness to do
business laws,' . . . which specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from
hiring, recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.").
15 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520, 523, 529 (invalidating Hazleton's ordinance
using express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption).
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flict with federal law in any way. 16 Courts have also used different le-
gal doctrines to hold housing ordinances unconstitutional.1 7
In this Note, I argue that courts should adopt a uniform frame-
work for analyzing local employer sanctions and housing laws that fo-
cuses on whether the laws conflict with or would undermine federal
immigration policy. Courts should resist the temptation to announce
an overly broad preemption doctrine that would undermine local gov-
ernments' ability to legislate in areas where they have strong interests.
Rather, courts should determine whether local ordinances upset the
policies central to the 1986 legislation: enforcing immigration laws
uniformly, preventing discrimination, and imposing only reasonable
costs on businesses. Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the scope of
past and current federal and local immigration regulations. Part II
discusses the divergent approaches taken by courts faced with the
question of whether federal immigration law and policy preempt a
local regulation concerning the employment of unauthorized work-
ers. Part III discusses the different approaches that two courts have
used to strike down local housing ordinances. Part IV proposes a
framework for determining whether federal law preempts local licens-
ing regulations. This framework focuses on whether the challenged
regulations conflict with federal laws, procedures, and policies or
whether the regulations merely impose an additional sanction for the
violation of federal immigration laws. Part V proposes that courts
should focus on several conflicts with federal law and policy to hold
ordinances that penalize property owners for leasing property to un-
documented immigrants unconstitutional per se.
16 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at
*12, 13, 18-19 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (holding that federal immigration law did not
preempt the City of Valley Park ordinance under any of the three categories of preemp-
tion-express, field, or conflict preemption). The court interpreted the ordinance as fall-
ing within permissible areas of local regulation. See id. at *16. It reasoned that the
language "If the federal government notifies the City of Valley Park that it is unable to
verify whether an individual is authorized to work in the United States, the City of Valley
Park shall take no further action" triggered the waiting period under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Id. at *16-17. However, from the language of the Valley
Park ordinance, it might not be clear to an average small-business owner that every adverse
finding by E-Verify triggers IRCA's waiting period and prevents him from taking negative
action against an employee. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
17 Compare Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530-33 (invalidating, under a conflict-
preemption theory, a housing ordinance requiring each person seeking a rental unit to
obtain an "occupancy permit" from Hazleton), with Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 866-74 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (invalidating, as an unlaw-
ful regulation of immigration, a housing ordinance requiring tenants to submit evidence
of citizenship or eligible immigration status before entering into a lease).
20101
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
I
IMMIGRATION REGULATION AT THE FEDERAL
AND LoCAL LEVELS
The balance of power between the federal and state government
has constantly shifted throughout U.S. history. A brief understanding
of the shifting power between federal and state governments in the
immigration context can help illuminate the current debate. The ten-
sion between the need for a uniform national policy and the need for
individual communities to be able to respond to their own unique
circumstances eliminates the possibility of an easy solution. The
power to regulate immigration has shifted from the states-in the in-
fancy of the United States, when local concerns were paramount-to
the federal government-when the need for a strong unitary policy
became apparent. Now, perhaps due to the federal government's in-
effective response to local concerns, localities are attempting to re-
claim their earlier, and greater, authority.
A. The Nineteenth Century
In the first hundred years of U.S. history, the federal government
played a limited role in immigration regulation, generally deferring to
the states. 18 Professor Gerald L. Neuman noted five categories of "im-
migration" regulations that states implemented during this period:
"regulation of the movement of criminals; public health regulation;
regulation of the movement of the poor; regulation of slavery; and
other policies of racial subordination."'19 Neuman criticized the fed-
eral exclusivity principle-the idea that the federal government has
exclusive control over immigration matters-by invoking this early
history.20
In the late nineteenth century, the federal government began to
exert greater control over immigration. An early federal immigration
law, enacted in 1875, excluded prostitutes and convicts. 21 In 1882,
Congress added persons likely to be public charges, lunatics, and idi-
ots to the list of those prohibited from immigrating to the United
18 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1835 (1993) (examining the regulation of immigra-
tion, primarily at the state level, before 1875 to dispel the widely held view that there was
no immigration law until 1875).
19 Id. at 1841.
20 See id. at 1839-40 ("[T]he history of state migration controls exposes the artificiality
of... [categorizing immigration regulation as inherently federal because of its potential
effect on foreign relations]. States retain other powers whose abuse could have interna-
tional repercussions, such as taxation of foreign corporations and prosecution of aliens for
local crimes.").
21 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 477.
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States. 22 Further, Congress enacted restrictions aimed at countries
deemed to contain "inferior" races. 23
Challenges to these racially restrictive laws led the Supreme
Court to announce a broad federal power, largely immune from judi-
cial review, to regulate immigration. In The Chinese Exclusion Case,2 4
the Court held that regulating entry into the United States is an inher-
ent federal power, a product of sovereignty. 2 5 The Court also distin-
guished the functions of state and federal government: "For local
interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national pur-
poses, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power."26
B. Modern Immigration Legislation
Federal immigration legislation of the last half-century provides
the backdrop for the current preemption debate. Congress enacted
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) to recodify ex-
isting immigration law.2 7 Although Congress has repeatedly amended
the INA, it remains the core statute for federal regulation of immigra-
tion and nationality.28
One amendment to the INA, which is important for preemption
analysis, is the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 2 9 En-
acted by Congress in 1986, IRCA prohibits, at a federal level, the em-
ployment of aliens not lawfully present and authorized to work in the
United States.3 0 The legislation also provides specific procedures for
determining worker eligibility.31 Further, IRCA supplies civil and
22 Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
23 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspending the immigration of
Chinese laborers into the United States for ten years).
24 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
25 See id. at 604.
26 Id. at 606. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court elabo-
rated further on the vast scope of federal power over immigration, holding that "[t]he
question whether . . . these aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United States
being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or the justice
of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the
Constitution over this subject." Id. at 731.
27 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
28 1 CHARL-Es GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.03[1] (rev. ed.
2009).
29 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
30 See INA § 274A(a) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (A) (2006).
31 See INA § 274A(b) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1) (A) (requiring employers to attest
under penalty of perjury that they have verified that the individual is eligible by inspecting
certain documentation); INA § 274A(b)(1)(B)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)-(D) (list-
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criminal penalties (of increasing severity for repeat offenders) for vio-
lations of its provisions.32 IRCA also expressly preempts states from
enacting any civil or criminal employer sanctions, but it excludes "li-
censing and similar laws" from the prohibition. 33
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) .34 IIRIRA constituted a major
change in U.S. immigration law. For example, it provided for re-
moval, without a hearing, of certain noncitizens; created additional
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability; reduced judicial review
in the immigration context; and redefined basic concepts that deter-
mined whether a noncitizen would face an exclusion or deportation
hearing.35 Because of IIRIRA's expansion of federal power in the area
of immigration regulation, it is also relevant to implied preemption
analysis of recent local immigration legislation.
C. Recent Municipal Ordinances
Several municipalities recently enacted ordinances that penalize
employers who employ unauthorized workers and landlords who lease
property to undocumented noncitizens. 36 Hazleton, Pennsylvania, en-
acted one such ordinance, which contains provisions typical of most
employer-sanctions ordinances. It provides that upon receipt of a
written and signed complaint, a city agency will request identity infor-
mation from an employer and suspend the license of any business that
does not comply within three business days.37 The city will then sub-
ing permissible forms of documentation to verify identity and employment eligibility); INA
§ 274A(b) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2) (requiring employees to attest under penalty of per-
jury that they are eligible to work).
32 See INA § 274A(e) (4) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e) (4) (A) (requiring escalating civil
penalties for employing unauthorized workers); INA § 274A(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1)
(requiring criminal penalties for employers that "engage[ ] in a pattern or practice of vio-
lations"); INA § 274A(f) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2) (permitting the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief against employers that have repeatedly employed unauthorized
workers).
33 INA § 274A(h) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section pre-
empt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licens-
ing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.").
34 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
35 GORDON ET AL., supra note 28, § 2.04[14][c].
36 See, e.g., Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1721, § 2 (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://
www.valleyparkmo.org/docs/Ordinances/ordinance%201721.pdf (creating penalties in
the housing context); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1722, § 4.A (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.valleyparkmo.org/docs/Ordinances/Ordinance1 7 22.pdf (creating penalties
in the employment context); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4.A (Sept. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazetonsecondordinance.pdf (creat-
ing penalties in the employment context); id. § 5.A (creating penalties in the housing
context).
37 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4.B(3).
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mit the documentation to the federal government to verify the
worker's immigration status.38 A safe harbor provision provides im-
munity for businesses that verify a worker's status using the Basic Pilot
Program (now called E-Verify) .39 Some ordinances, including Hazle-
ton's, also create a private cause of action for a lawful worker dis-
charged by an employer who employs unauthorized workers and does
not participate in the Basic Pilot Program. 40 If a private citizen suc-
ceeds in a suit against such an employer, he can recover treble dam-
ages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs.4 1
Municipalities have also enacted ordinances that penalize land-
lords for leasing a dwelling unit to undocumented immigrants. 42 The
ordinances generally prohibit the "harboring" of undocumented im-
migrants. 43 Hazleton's procedures regarding a landlord suspected of
leasing property to an undocumented immigrant are similar to the
employer-sanctions procedures: any person may file a written com-
plaint, a city agency will verify the tenant's immigration status with the
federal government, and the landlord will have five days to evict a
tenant after notification of a violation. If the landlord does not com-
ply, the landlord faces a license suspension during which he may not
collect rent from any tenants. 44
Moreover, there is often a requirement that the landlord verify
the immigration status of potential tenants or that tenants register
with a local agency. Hazleton has a safe harbor for landlords who
verify the immigration status of tenants in advance. 45 A Farmers
Branch, Texas, ordinance similarly requires landlords to verify the im-
migration status before entering into a lease,46 while a separate Hazle-
ton ordinance requires prospective tenants to apply for a permit and
show proof of legal residency.47 Rather than using the relevant defini-
tions provided by federal immigration law, Farmers Branch uses De-
38 Id.
39 Id. § 4.B(5).
40 Id. § 4.E(1).
41 Id. § 4.E(2).
42 See, e.g., id. § 5; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892, § 2 (Nov. 13, 2006), availa-
ble at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/city-of farmersbranchordi-
nanceno_2892_2.pdf.
43 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 5. The Hazleton ordinance, known as the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA), defines "harboring" as "to let, lease, or rent a dwell-
ing unit to an illegal alien" or "[t]o suffer or permit the occupancy of the dwelling unit by
an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law." Id. § 5.A(1).
44 Id. § 5.B.
45 Id. § 5.B(9).
46 Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892, § 2.
47 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7.b.I(g) (Aug. 15, 2006), available athttp:/
/www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton firstordinance.pdf (requiring each tenant to
apply for and obtain an occupancy permit by supplying certain information, including
proof of legal citizenship and/or residency).
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partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations to
determine tenant eligibility.48 These employment and housing ordi-
nances have led to several high-profile lawsuits brought by immigrant-
advocacy groups challenging the local government's authority to act
in these areas.4
9
II
CHALLENGES TO LOCAL EMPLOYER-SANCTIONS LAWS
Federal courts derived the preemption doctrine from the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 50 Congress may expressly
forbid states from regulating a specified area of law. Through federal
immigration legislation, Congress has used this power to expressly
preempt states and localities from imposing criminal and civil penal-
ties on employers of unauthorized workers. 51 Congress can also im-
pliedly preempt states and localities from legislating in a particular
area. The federal government's intention to occupy an entire field of
law can preempt any local legislation in that field, and a conflict be-
tween local and federal law and policy will also preempt local
legislation.
A. De Canas and Categories of Preemption
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided De Canas v. Bica,52 a case
concerning federal preemption of local immigration regulations. In
De Canas, the Court decided the validity of a California statute
"provid[ing] that '[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien
who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such
employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident work-
48 See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (May 22, 2007) (referring to HUD regu-
lations throughout).
49 See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir.
2009) (challenging the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which sanctions employers who hire
unauthorized workers by revoking the employer's state license to do business in Arizona);
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861-62 (N.D.
Tex. 2008) (challenging the constitutionality of Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903, the sec-
ond iteration of Ordinance 2892, which imposes citizenship and immigration certification
requirements on landlords); Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008
WL 294294, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (challenging Valley Park ordinances regarding
leasing rental units to and employing undocumented immigrants); Lozano v. City of Hazle-
ton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-85 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (challenging Hazleton ordinances regu-
lating the housing and employment of undocumented immigrants).
50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
51 INA § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
52 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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ers.' ' '53  The central issue raised by this case was whether the
Supremacy Clause and the INA preempted the California statute. 54
Although this decision predates IRCA and courts have questioned its
validity on some issues, it continues to provide the framework lower
courts follow for implied preemption analysis. 55
In De Canas, the Court undertook a three-step analysis. First, the
Court considered whether the California statute regulated immigra-
tion.56 The Court maintained that the "[p] ower to regulate immigra-
tion is unquestionably exclusively a federal power. ' 57 However, not
every regulation that affects immigrants is an immigration regula-
tion.58 Rather, immigration regulation is "essentially a determination
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. '5 9 The Court
held that the California statute did not regulate immigration because
it adopted federal standards to impose criminal sanctions on employ-
ers, making any indirect impact on immigration purely speculative. 60
Second, the Court inquired whether the federal government had
preempted local regulation in the entire field of regulating the em-
ployment of undocumented immigrants. 6 ' The Court considered
whether "'the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.' ,62
When such preemption occurs, it is a form of implied preemption
known as field preemption. 63 Ultimately, the Court held that the INA
did not preclude states from regulating the employment of unautho-
rized workers. 64 In coming to that conclusion, the Court emphasized
the plaintiffs failure to show any congressional intention to bar state
regulations concerning the employment of unauthorized workers. 65
Congress's extensive immigration statute reflected the complex na-
53 Id. at 352 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1971) (repealed 1988)). Migrant farm
workers brought the case and alleged that the defendants, farm labor contractors, had
refused the migrant workers' continued employment because, in violation of § 2805, the
farm labor contractors knowingly employed unauthorized workers. See id. at 353-54.
54 Id. at 352-53.
55 See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858,
866-67 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (discussing the three tests derived from De Canas).
56 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-56.
57 Id. at 354.
58 Id. at 355.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 355-56.
61 See id. at 356-63.
62 Id. at 356 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963)).
63 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
64 See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57 ("States possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.").
65 Id. at 358.
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ture of the subject rather than an intention to occupy the entire
field. 66
Third, the Court analyzed whether the California statute con-
flicted with Congress's purposes and objectives in enacting the INA.6 7
To determine whether such a conflict exists, the Court asks whether
the local legislation "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' in enacting
the INA. ''68 This form of preemption is known as conflict preemp-
tion.6 9 The Court was unable to reach this question, however, because
California courts failed to state how they would construe the statute,
making it impossible for the Supreme Court to determine whether
the statute impaired the objectives of the INA.70 On its face, a logical
construction of the statute would prohibit the employment of aliens
"'not entitled to lawful residence in the United States'" but permitted
to work under federal law; such a construction would unconstitution-
ally conflict with federal law.7 1
B. Express Preemption
When litigants challenge a local law as preempted by federal law,
a court will look to see whether Congress has enacted a specific pre-
emption provision and determine whether the local law falls within
the area proscribed by that provision. On this ground, a district court
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently struck down as uncon-
stitutional a Hazleton, Pennsylvania, ordinance barring the employ-
ment of unauthorized workers in Lozano v. City of Hazleton.7 2 The
ordinance mandated license suspensions for businesses that employ
"unlawful worker[s]" and created a private cause of action for lawful
workers discharged by such businesses.73
The court held that Congress expressly preempted the Hazleton
ordinance by enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2) .74 Hazleton unsuccess-
fully argued that it complied with federal requirements by sanctioning
employers with a license suspension rather than a criminal or civil
66 See id. at 359-60 ("'Given the complexity of the matter addressed by Congress ....
a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate, completely apart from any
questions of pre-emptive intent.'" (quoting N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 415 (1973))).
67 See id. at 363-65.
68 Id. at 363 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963)).
69 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
70 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363-65.
71 Id. at 364 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1971) (repealed 1988)).
72 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518-21.
73 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, §§ 4.B(4), 4.E (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http:/
/www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton secondordinance.pdf.
74 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519-21.
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penalty. 75 The court rejected that argument as "at odds with the plain
language of the express pre-emption provision" because "[i]t would
not make sense for Congress in limiting the state's authority to allow
states and municipalities the opportunity to provide the ultimate sanc-
tion, but no lesser penalty."76 The court relied on legislative history to
establish the scope of the savings clause in § 1324a(h) (2): the savings
clause permits states and municipalities to suspend business licenses
only for violations of IRCA, not local regulations. 77 Thus, although
the Lozano court stated that the effect of the Hazleton ordinance was
contrary to the "plain language" of § 1324a(h) (2), the court looked to
congressional intent rather than relying on a strict interpretation of
the statute's plain language.
Less than a year after the Lozano decision, a district court in the
Eastern District of Missouri considered a challenge to a Valley Park,
Missouri ordinance similar to the Hazleton ordinance in Gray v. City of
Valley Park, Missouri.78 Despite the similarities between the two stat-
utes, the Gray court dismissed the expansive Lozano opinion as non-
binding, mentioning it only once, in a footnote. 79 As a threshold
matter, the court determined that there was a presumption against
preemption because the ordinance regulated business licenses, an
area historically occupied by the states.80
The court proceeded to consider whether 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2)
expressly preempted the Valley Park ordinance-specifically, whether
the ordinance fell under the savings clause as a "licensing or similar
law." The court found that the ordinance, on its face, looked like a
licensing law: it provided for the issuance or denial of business per-
mits.8t Although the plaintiffs argued that the court should consider
congressional intent like the Lozano court,82 the Gray court reasoned
that considering congressional intent was not necessary to determine
75 Id. at 519.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 519-20 ("Therefore, the express pre-emption clause applies generally, except
for state or local laws dealing with 'suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license' to
an entity found to have violated the sanction provisions of IRCA." (quoting H.R. REP. No.
99-682(1), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662)).
78 No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
79 See id. at *10 n.13 ("The Court respectfully notes that the Pennsylvania decision is
not binding, and therefore, the Court will conduct its own thorough analysis of the issues
presented.").
80 Id. at *8. The Gray court decided that the ordinance did not regulate immigration,
an area historically occupied by the federal government, because "[t] he Supreme Court in
DeCanas [ ] defined a regulation of immigration as 'essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain."' Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)).
81 Id. at *10.
82 See id. ("Plaintiffs dispute that the Ordinance falls within the exception [for licens-
ing or similar laws], arguing that it would violate the intent of congress [sic] to interpret
the statute so that a state or local government was forbidden from imposing criminal or
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"whether the ordinance is a licensing or other similar law."83 The
plaintiffs also argued that the ordinance was not a licensing law be-
cause it applied to businesses exempt from obtaining a business per-
mit. The court rejected this argument, however, holding that the
ordinance was "similar" to a licensing law in that context. In addition,
the court reasoned that the ordinance, which exempted certain busi-
nesses from licensing requirements, was itself a licensing regulation. 84
Although the Gray court determined that the language of
§ 1324a(h) (2) was unambiguous, the court proceeded, in dicta, to
look at congressional intent. Looking at the same congressional re-
ports as the Lozano court, the Gray court reached the opposite conclu-
sion. Although conceding that the language of the House Report was
ambiguous regarding whether a finding by the federal government of
a violation of federal immigration law is necessary to impose a licens-
ing penalty, the court found that the language of the statute was not
ambiguous and was controlling.8 5 Because the Valley Park ordinance
is a licensing law, the court held it valid under § 1324a(h) (2).86
In September 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals became
the first federal appellate court to weigh in on the issue of state and
local regulations of the employment of unauthorized workers in Chica-
nos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano.8 7 In Chicanos Por La Causa, plain-
tiffs brought a facial challenge to the Legal Arizona Workers Act
("LAWA"), which-like the Hazleton and Valley Park ordinances-re-
voked the licenses of employers that hired unauthorized workers.88 At
trial, the district court held that federal law did not preempt LAWA. 89
The appeal focused primarily on whether LAWA was a "licensing
[or] similar law[ ]" under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2).9o The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that LAWA was a "licensing law" under § 1324a(h) (2) and
therefore not expressly preempted.9 1 First, determining that LAWA
was an employment regulation, an area of state concern, the court
applied a presumption against preemption.9 2 Then, using a plain-
meaning approach, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
civil sanctions, but could 'impose the enormous penalty of entirely shuttering a business.'"
(citation omitted)); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83 Gray, 2008 VArL 294294, at *10.
84 Id. at *11.
85 Id. at *12 ("Therefore the ambiguity in the legislative history is irrelevant. The
plain meaning of the statute clearly provides for state and local governments to pass licens-
ing laws which touch on the subject of illegal immigration." (footnote omitted)).
86 Id.
87 Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
88 See id. at 860.
89 See id. ("The district court held that the law was not preempted."); Ariz. Contractors
Ass'n v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975-76 (D. Ariz. 2007).
90 Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860.
91 Id. at 864-86.
92 Id. at 864.
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"license" applies only to learned professions, not businesses.93 Like
the Gray court, the Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history sup-
ported upholding local regulations concerning the employment of
unauthorized workers. The court reasoned that language in the legis-
lative history-recognizing states' ability to "condition an employer's
'fitness to do business' on hiring documented workers"-contradicted
the plaintiff's reading requiring a federally adjudicated violation of
IRCA to revoke a license. 94 In addition, the court noted that the "hy-
pothetical possibility" of inconsistent state and federal judgments was
not a basis for sustaining a facial challenge. 95 Thus, the court held
that [AWA was a "licensing" measure within the meaning of
§ 1324a(h) (2).
C. Field Preemption
A court may also strike down a local law if the nature of the regu-
lated subject matter or Congress's legislation in that area inherently
leaves no room for local regulation. 96 Using this field-preemption
theory, the Lozano court held that the Hazleton Illegal Immigration
Relief Act (IIRA) Ordinance was invalid. Two factors controlled this
outcome: (1) a strong federal interest in the field of immigration and
(2) the pervasiveness of federal regulations in the field of immigra-
tion.9 7 The court emphasized the importance of the history of federal
immigration regulations dating back to the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, including an elaborate discussion in an appendix. 98 In addition,
the court relied on the constitutional grant of power to the federal
government in the Naturalization Clause.99 Moreover, the court
pointed to Supreme Court precedent stating that states and munici-
palities do not have a strong interest in regulating immigration. 100
After discussing the strong federal interest in the field of immi-
gration, the Lozano court considered the pervasiveness of federal regu-
lations in the field of immigration and concluded that "Congress has
occupied the field of employment of unauthorized aliens with
IRCA."'' 1 The court relied on Supreme Court precedent construing
93 Id.; see also BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1002 (9th ed. 2009) (defining license as "[a]
permission, usu[ally] revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful").
94 Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 58
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662).
95 Id.
96 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
97 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
98 See id. app. at 556-62 (discussing the history of federal immigration regulation in
the United States).
99 Id. at 522; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization").
100 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)).
101 Id. at 523.
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IRCA as demonstrating an intention to occupy the field.' 02 Further,
the court listed specific provisions of IRCA to demonstrate that "[i] t
leaves no room for state regulation."' 03 The defendants relied on De
Canas to argue that federal law did not preempt the Hazleton IIRA.10 4
However, the court rejected this argument because Congress's later
enactment of IRCA, which did not exist at the time of De Canas, repre-
sented an intention to occupy the field of immigration. 10 5 Thus, be-
cause of the strong federal interest and pervasive federal regulation of
the field of immigration, the court held that the Hazleton IIRA was an
unconstitutional regulation in the exclusively federal field of
immigration.
The Gray court, as a threshold matter before reaching implied
preemption issues, considered the validity of an implied preemption
claim after determining that the challenged law complied with an ex-
press preemption clause. The court held that valid implied preemp-
tion claims may remain despite compliance with an express
preemption clause. 1 06 The language of the clause at issue, however, is
the strongest evidence of Congress's preemptive intent. 10 7 The Su-
preme Court previously held that a plaintiff may challenge a state stat-
ute-despite its compliance with a preemption clause stating the
scope of permissible state legislation-if the state statute conflicts with
the purposes and objectives of Congress. l08
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether field preemption
barred the ordinance. Relying on the discussion in De Canas, the
court found that Congress did not intend to completely occupy the
field of regulating employment of unauthorized workers. 10 9 Moreo-
ver, the preemption provision in IRCA supported a finding of no field
102 See id. (describing IRCA as "'a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment
of illegal aliens in the United States"' (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002))).
103 Id. The IRCA provisions referred to by the court include INA § 274A(e)(5), 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e) (5) (2006) (creating civil fines); INA § 274A(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (cre-
ating criminal penalties); INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (creating penalties for document
fraud); and INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (prohibiting unfair employment practices in the
immigration context).
104 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 524 ("Not 'every state enactment which in any way
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted.'" (quoting De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976))).
105 Id. at 524-25.
106 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at
*12-13 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
107 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) ("[Our 'task of statutory
construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.'" (quoting CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993))).
108 See Gray, 2008 WAIL 294294, at *12 (citing Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65).
109 Id. at *13.
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preemption because § 1324a(h) (2) permits local licensing
regulations.' 10
D. Conflict Preemption
The Lozano court also held that the Hazleton IIRA was invalid
under a conflict preemption theory. The standard for conflict pre-
emption is whether the law "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'
or whether it is "'impossible for a... party to comply with both state
and federal requirements.""'1  The court noted that although IRCA
and the Hazleton IIRA have a similar purpose-penalizing employers
of unauthorized workers-they use different means to achieve that
purpose.' 12 While federal law requires employers to review a worker's
documents and use an 1-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form to
establish worker eligibility,113 the Hazleton IIRA supplemented fed-
eral law by also requiring the employer to present the worker's docu-
ments to the local Code Enforcement Office, which determined the
status of the worker by contacting the federal government." 4 The Ha-
zleton IIRA also conflicted with IRCA by failing to contain an excep-
tion for casual domestic workers and independent contractors. 115
Moreover, the Hazleton IIRA mandated the use of the Basic Pilot Pro-
gram, while federal law makes use of the Program optional. 116 Finally,
the timeframe for employers to respond to alleged violations also va-
ried under the Hazleton IIRA and IRCA. 17
In addition to these specific conflicts between federal and local
law, the court found a conflict in how the United States and Hazleton
balanced the interests of preventing illegal employment and protect-
ing the rights of businesses and workers. 81 8 The Hazleton IIRA placed
greater burdens on employers, in the interest of preventing illegal em-
110 Id.
" 11 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
112 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
113 See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (b) (2008); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
114 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4.B(4) (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://
www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazletonsecondordinance.pdf; Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at
526.
115 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
116 Id. at 527.
117 See id. (noting that under federal law, an employer may not terminate an employee
based on his eligibility status for at least ten days if the employee contests the initial finding
that he is unauthorized to work; under the Hazleton IRA, however, an employer must
terminate the employee within three business days and the employee has no opportunity
to challenge the finding of ineligibility).
118 See id. at 527-29 ("[T] he employment provisions of IIRA differ from and conflict
with IRCA.").
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ployment, than IRCA. Based on these and other grounds, the Lozano
court found that the Hazleton IIRA conflicted with both the letter of
IRCA and its policy goals. Therefore, the court held that the Hazleton
IIRA was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The Lozano
court announced a broad scope to federal preemption of local regula-
tions governing the employment of unauthorized workers. Later deci-
sions have not followed this restricted vision of local authority.
The Gray court also considered a conflict-preemption claim but
found no conflicts between the Valley Park ordinance and IRCA and
rejected the conflicts the Lozano court discussed. 119 Valley Park ques-
tioned the validity of the federal regulation exempting domestic work-
ers and independent contractors from the definition of the term
"employee" by noting that the regulation may not be a reasonable in-
terpretation of the statute. 120 The court agreed but also stated that
even if the regulations were valid, there was no conflict because Con-
gress did not express an intention to forbid states from regulating the
employment of domestic workers and independent contractors. 121
Further, the court rejected an argument that the procedures of
the Valley Park ordinance and IRCA conflict. Although a preliminary
glance indicates a conflict, a closer inspection of the ordinance reveals
that a "tentative nonconfirmation" from the Basic Pilot program tolls
the procedures of the ordinance and allows for the federal procedures
to run their course. 122 Finally, the court found no conflict between
the ordinance and IRCA concerning the use of the Basic Pilot pro-
gram. The Valley Park ordinance mandated participation in the Basic
Pilot program only when the federal government confirmed that an
employer had hired two or more unauthorized workers.1 23 The court
found that this provision was consistent with a provision of the
IIRIRA. 124 In addition, the court noted that although the federal gov-
ernment chose not to make participation mandatory, a locality may
119 Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at
*14-19 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
120 See id. at *14. Compare INA § 274A(a) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (B) (2006)
(providing no exceptions to the prohibition on hiring workers without complying with the
eligibility-verification system of § 1324a(b)), with 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1 (f) (2008) (defining the
term "employee" as "an individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages
or other remuneration but does not mean independent contractors .. . or those engaged
in casual domestic employment. .. ").
121 Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *14-15.
122 Id.at*17.
123 Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1722, § 4B(6)(b) (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.valleyparkmo.org/docs/Ordinances/Ordinancel722.pdf; Gray, 2008 WL
294294, at *17.
124 See Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *18; see also INA§ 274A(e)(4)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(e) (4) (B) (ii) (2006) (stating that a cease and desist order for hiring unauthorized
workers may require the entity to "take such other remedial action as is appropriate").
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still provide for greater enforcement than the federal government. 125
Thus, Gray rejected nearly all of Lozano's findings and found a sub-
stantially similar regulation lawful and not preempted by federal im-
migration law and policy.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether federal law impliedly pre-
empted LAWA's requirement that employers use E-Verify. The court
held that this requirement "for which there is no substitute under de-
velopment in either the state, federal, or private sectors, is not ex-
pressly or impliedly preempted by federal policy."' 26 The court
reasoned that Congress knew how to explicitly preempt state laws
mandating the use of E-Verify; however, it did not do so. 127 Moreover,
Congress envisioned broader use of E-Verify and showed no intention
to restrict its use. 128 Thus, the first appellate court to weigh in on
local regulations of employment of unauthorized workers has sided
with the Gray court and rejected Lozano.129
III
CHALLENGES TO LoCAL HOUSING-SANCTIONs LAws
Ordinances penalizing property owners who provide housing to
undocumented immigrants have had less success in federal courts
than the employer-sanctions ordinances. Federal courts in Penn-
sylvania and Texas have struck down housing-sanctions ordinances as
preempted by federal law. 130 Valley Park, Missouri, chose to repeal its
housing ordinance and defend only the employer-sanctions provisions
in court.' 13 Other communities have also repealed housing ordi-
125 Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *19.
126 Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2009).
127 Id. at 867.
128 Id. The court distinguished Chicanos Por La Causa from Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). In Geier, the Court held that a federal law requiring ten
percent of a manufacturer's cars to be equipped with a passive restraint preempted a com-
mon-law tort action for failure to include airbags. 529 U.S. at 864-65. Geier found a con-
flict between the state law and the federal policy of balancing the interests of consumer
safety and encouraging development and competition through the use of alternative safety
systems. Id. at 881-82. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not believe that the federal
government was "encouraging alternative systems" by making use of E-Verify permissive;
rather, "Congress plainly envisioned and endorsed an increase in its usage." Chicanos Por
La Causa, 558 F.3d at 867. Thus, the court held that there was no conflict.
129 The Ninth Circuit mentioned Gray and Lozano each only once after concluding its
own analysis. See Chicanos PorLa Causa, 558 F.3d at 865-66 (noting that it was reaching the
same conclusion as Gray but not as Lozano without explicitly discussing the analysis of ei-
ther case).
130 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 879
(N.D. Tex. 2008); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 533 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
131 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
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nances when faced with expensive lawsuits and limited chances of
success. 132
A. Conflict Preemption
The Lozano court held that Hazleton's ordinances penalizing
landowners for leasing property to undocumented immigrants con-
flicted with federal law and were void. 133 First, the court found a con-
flict because the federal government permits several categories of
undocumented immigrants to work and live in the United States. 134
Although the federal government will allow these undocumented im-
migrants to remain in the United States, Hazleton's ordinance would
deny them access to housing.135 Next, the court noted that changing
immigration status is a complex procedure.' 36 For example, an indi-
vidual with a bona fide application for adjustment of status will often
have no documents establishing a valid claim to remain in the country
until the application is approved-perhaps years later.' 37 Moreover,
some individuals may be permitted to regularize their status only
when they are in removal proceedings. 38 The ordinances assumed
that the federal government seeks the removal of all undocumented
immigrants; however, federal immigration rules are much more com-
plex, and the use of E-Verify is insufficient to determine whether an
alien should be removed.' 39 The court noted that the "'structure of
the immigration statuses makes it impossible for the State to deter-
mine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will
be deported.' "140 Thus, the court held that the housing provisions of
the IIRA conflicted with federal law because these provisions imposed
greater burdens on aliens than did federal law by prohibiting their
residence in Hazleton despite their continued permission to remain
in the United States. 1 41
132 See, e.g., Jill P. Capuzzo, Immigrants Hated Law, and Now It's Repealed, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2007, at B2 (noting that Riverside, NewJersey, population 8000, repealed a hous-
ing ordinance in part because it "amassed close to $100,000 in legal fees in the preliminary
preparation for the legal fight").
133 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 529-33.
134 Id. at 530-31. Some of these categories include aliens who have applied for asylum
or suspension of deportation. See id. at 531. Moreover, courts may release aliens with final
orders of removal "if there is no likelihood of their removal in the foreseeable future." Id.
(citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)).
135 Id. at 531.
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 531-32.
140 Id. at 532 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
141 Id.
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Additionally, the Lozano court held that federal law also pre-
empted the Tenant Registration Ordinance, which required potential
tenants to apply for a permit with the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office.1 42 This provision directly conflicted with federal law because it
required a local agency to determine if a Hazleton resident was prop-
erly in the country, a determination that only a federal immigration
judge can properly make. 143
B. Regulation-of-Immigration Preemption
A federal court in Texas has also invalidated a housing ordinance
on preemption grounds in Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch. 44 The court first noted that it was legally irrelevant that the
residents of Farmers Branch passed the ordinance by popular vote: "A
court that approves an ordinance merely because it is politically popu-
lar abdicates its judicial obligation to decide independently and on
existing legal precedent whether the ordinance passes constitutional
muster."'145 Also, the court distinguished Gray and Arizona Contrac-
tors-the trial court decision upheld in Chicanos Por La Causa-be-
cause those cases involved employer sanctions and required the
federal government to make the final determination of worker
eligibility.146
Instead of resting its decision on conflict preemption, like Lozano,
Villas at Parkside Partners held that federal law preempted the Farmers
Branch ordinance because it was a regulation of immigration, which
meant that it failed the first De Canas test.' 47 First, the court noted
that the Farmers Branch ordinance "limits those with 'eligible immi-
gration status' to those noncitizens who are eligible for federal hous-
ing subsidies."'148 Thus, Farmers Branch did not adopt federal
142 Id. at 530, 533.
143 See id. at 533; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2006) ("An immigration judge shall
conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien."); id.
§ 1229a(a) (3) ("[These proceedings are] the sole and exclusive procedure for determin-
ing whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so
admitted, removed from the United States.").
144 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 874 (N.D. Tex. 2008). This case challenged Ordinance No.
2903, which called for an election on the housing ordinance. Id. Ordinance No. 2903
replaced Ordinance No. 2892, which was repealed after a state court issued a temporary
restraining order finding that its passage may have violated the Texas Open Meetings Act.
Id. at 861. The new ordinance (2903) passed easily, by a vote of 4058 to 1941. Id. Finally,
the court granted a preliminary injunction before the ordinance went into effect. Id.
145 Id. at 864.
146 Id. at 865-66.
147 Id. at 869; see also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."); supra notes 56-60 and ac-
companying text (describing the De Canas court's analysis of whether the state ordinance
was a regulation of immigration).
148 Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
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immigration requirements but rather used federal housing regula-
tions to determine which noncitizens could rent housing. 149 The
court held that this was a regulation of immigration in violation of the
Supremacy Clause. 150  Second, the court noted that the Farmers
Branch ordinance required owners and property managers to deter-
mine the immigration status of potential tenants. 15' Requiring private
citizens and city officials to make determinations of immigration sta-
tus also constitutes a "regulation of immigration" in violation of De
Canas.15 2 The court rejected Farmers Branch's argument that it was
supporting the federal government's enforcement efforts because fed-
eral law provides a specific mechanism for localities to assist in immi-
gration enforcement-so-called 28 7 (g) agreements. 153  Finally,
because the court found the ordinance to be a "regulation of immi-
gration" for the above reasons, the court did not find it necessary to
address arguments concerning field and conflict preemption.15 4
IV
LocAL EMPLOYER-SANCTIONS LAWS AND FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION POLICY
The current state of the law leaves states and municipalities una-
ware of the extent to which they may enact regulations that touch on
immigration matters. This uncertainty can lead to expensive legal
fees for a municipality defending an ordinance.' 55 Although employ-
ment has traditionally been a local concern, the federal govern-
ment-with the enactment of IRCA-has signaled that the
employment of unauthorized workers is a matter of national concern.
Nevertheless, courts should be careful to not strike down every law
touching on the subject of immigration because an overly expansive
view of field preemption could result in localities' losing the ability to
regulate in areas where they have a strong interest. In fact, Congress
expressly allowed some room for local regulation, 156 leaving it to the
149 Id. at 871.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 873-74.
152 Id. at 874; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,
770 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[D]eterminations of immigration status by state agents amounts to
immigration regulation .. . [even when] made . . .for the limited purpose of denying
benefits.").
153 Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 873 ("'[T]he Attorney General may
enter into a written agreement with a State, .. . pursuant to which an officer or employee
of the State... may carry out [an investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens] ...
at the expense of the State . . .and to the extent consistent with State and local law.'"
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006))).
154 See id. at 874 ("In light of the court's ruling with respect to the first De Canas test, it
does not consider the parties' arguments regarding the second and third De Canas tests.").
155 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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courts to define the boundaries of permissible regulation. Courts
should make clear to local governments that any employer-licensing
penalties should closely track federal law so as not to conflict with
federal immigration policy by imposing broader liability or excessive
burdens on businesses.
A. Express Preemption Under IRCA
The text of IRCA's preemption clause 15 7 has led courts to contra-
dictory results even though they claim to rely on the plain meaning of
the statute. The Lozano court reasoned that permitting the revocation
of business licenses was contrary to the plain language of the stat-
ute. 15 8 In Chicanos Por La Causa, the Ninth Circuit relied on Black's
Law Dictionary to interpret "licensing" but did not consider the mean-
ing of "similar law."'159 The court did not try to reconcile the inconsis-
tency of preempting a $250 civil fine but permitting a municipality to
shut down a business entirely. Finally, the Gray court, in construing
§ 1324a(h) (2), also relied on a plain-meaning approach. It con-
cluded that the application of the Valley Park ordinance to businesses
exempt from obtaining a license fell under the "similar laws" language
but did not define the scope of that phrase.1 60
The express language of IRCA exempts local licensing regula-
tions from the preemption provision without making clear the scope
of this exemption. 161 The legislative history confirms that Congress
intended to permit states and localities to suspend or revoke the li-
censes of businesses that violate the employer-sanctions provisions of
IRCA.16 2 Courts should look at IRCA in its entirety to interpret the
157 See supra note 33.
158 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519-20 (M.D. Pa. 2007). That
court, however, did not rely exclusively on the plain language of the statute as it also con-
sidered congressional intent as derived from legislative history. Id. ("In addition to being
counterintuitive to the plain language of [IRCA's express preemption clause] .... Hazle-
ton's interpretation [that a business license suspension is a "licensing or similar law" such
that it falls within the exception to the express preemption clause] is contrary to its legisla-
tive history.").
159 See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009).
160 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at
*10-11 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) ("Plaintiffs['] argument fails, firstly, because IRCA states
'licensing or similar law[,]' the law is clearly a similar law as its penalties are limited to the
suspension of a business license." (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2) (2006))).
161 See supra note 33.
162 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662
("[IRCA's employer sanctions provisions] are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful
state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a li-
cense to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this
legislation. Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or 'fitness to do
business laws,' such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which specifically
require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or referring undocu-
mented aliens.").
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meaning of the savings clause and the scope of the exemption.163 In-
stead of taking such an approach, however, several courts have ended
their inquiry with the language of § 1324a(h) (2) without considering
the clause in the context of IRCA's comprehensive regulatory
scheme.' 64 The Lozano court correctly considered the effect of the
scope of the savings clause on IRCA in its totality, but the court did
not suggest an interpretation that would give the words any
meaning.165
Courts should interpret § 1324a(h) (2) to require a federally adju-
dicated violation of IRCA before a state or municipality may impose a
licensing penalty. The language of the statute and the legislative his-
tory have led to varying interpretations of what process IRCA requires
before a state may revoke a business license.16 6 The legislative history
is vague and merely states that a locality may revoke licenses of a "per-
son who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in
this legislation"; this language makes clear that there must be a viola-
tion of IRCA, as opposed to a local regulation, but it does not define
what entity must find the violation. 167 However, a court must inter-
pret the savings clause in light of the entire regulatory scheme. 16 8 Al-
lowing a local determination of whether an employer hired an
unauthorized worker would be contrary to Congress's creation of a
uniform standard for regulating the employment of unauthorized
workers. 169 Further, businesses would have difficulties adjusting to
the approach suggested in Gray: complying with thousands of poten-
tially conflicting procedures for determining whether a worker is au-
thorized.1 70  Adjudication by a federal entity would comply with
163 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) ("[W]e are obliged in
interpreting the saving clause to consider ... the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a
whole.").
164 See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865-66; Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *10-11.
165 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518-19 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(describing IRCA as a "'comprehensive scheme"') (citation omitted).
166 Compare Brief of Appellees at 75, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir.
Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/lozanovhazletonbrief.
pdf ("The House Report underscores what IRCA itself establishes: Congress intended that
any sanction, even under a federal licensing law, must await completion of the IRCA sanc-
tions process, and a federal finding that the employer has violated IRCA."), with Gray, 2008
WL 294294, at *12 ("Although the wording in the house report is somewhat ambiguous,
the wording of the statute is perfectly clear .... There is no requirement in the statute that
a finding be made by the federal government that a person has employed ... unauthorized
aliens, only that those are the individuals who are subject to penalty.").
167 H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.
168 See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 51 (considering the entire regulatory scheme cre-
ated by ERISA when interpreting that legislation's savings clause).
169 SeeImmigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100
Stat. 3359, 3384 ("IT]he immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigor-
ously and unformly. . . ." (emphasis added)).
170 See Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *17 ("In the event that the Basic Pilot program re-
ports back a tentative nonconfirmation, then the Ordinance's three day time table is
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Congress's goals of achieving uniform enforcement and not overbur-
dening businesses.1 71 Because of the statutory ambiguity concerning
which entities may find an employer violation, courts should construe
§ 1324a(h) (2) to require a federally adjudicated decision because
such a requirement would be consistent with IRCA's regulatory
scheme and policy objectives.
In addition, courts should hold that the express language of
§ 1324a(h) (2) preempts any local law that creates a private right of
action against employers who hire unauthorized workers. The plain
language of IRCA bars states and municipalities from imposing crimi-
nal and civil sanctions on employers of unauthorized workers. 172 Ha-
zleton has argued that the private right of action is not a "sanction"
because the plaintiff has discretion to bring an action and success is
not guaranteed.173 However, the private right of action is a civil sanc-
tion because Hazleton has created a civil "penalty ... that results from
failure to comply with a law." 174 It is irrelevant that the potential ac-
tion is discretionary and success is not guaranteed; the same is true of
government actions.
Courts should also interpret the savings clause of § 1324a(h) (2)
to include fitness-to-do-business laws in addition to regular licensing
laws. Interpreting the savings clause using the plain-meaning ap-
proach does not define the scope of the "similar laws" language. The
phrase "similar laws" does not carry as clear a meaning as the Gray
tolled, pending completion of the federal determination, which allows the employee eight
federal government business days to respond to the nonconfirmation."). It can be difficult
for business to comply with federal immigration law, and in rejecting the Plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the Valley Park Ordinance and IRCA's processes conflict, Gray suggests that local
governments may also require businesses to reconcile complex federal immigration law
with vague, yet theoretically compatible, local regulations and procedures. See id. at
*16-17; Brief of Amici Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
et al. in Support of Appellees at 5-9, Lozano, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 2008), available
at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/USChComamicus.pdf (discussing federal and local
regulations for verifying worker-eligibility status). The administrative costs of such a system
would likely be substantial.
171 See Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
legislative history of section 1324a indicates that Congress intended to minimize the bur-
den and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process.").
172 See INA § 274A(h) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2) (2006) ("The provisions of this sec-
tion preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions.., upon those who
employ .. .unauthorized aliens.").
173 See Brief of Appellant, City of Hazleton at 47-52, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No.
07-3531 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/Hzdsbrief
3d.pdf. Additionally, Hazleton argued that the private right of action is a "similar law"
within the savings clause of § 1324a(h)(2). Id. at 52. It is not a "similar law" under
§ 1324a(h)(2). For a discussion of the proper construction of the language of "similar
law," see infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
174 BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY 1458 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the term "sanction").
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court suggests.' 75 Because the language of the statute is ambiguous,
courts should turn to the legislative history for guidance.' 76 After dis-
cussing Congress's intent not to interfere with local licensing
processes, the legislative history also states that the statute is not in-
tended to preempt fitness-to-do-business laws. 177 Furthermore, Con-
gress has consistently expressed a policy preference against
preempting state or local laws licensing businesses that supply la-
bor. 178 Thus, because fitness-to-do-business and licensing laws are the
only laws that Congress explicitly mentioned in the legislative history,
courts should interpret the phrase "similar laws" to include the fitness-
to-do-business laws. There is no indication in the legislative history
that Congress intended to give any broader scope to the phrase "simi-
lar laws."
B. Field Preemption
Courts should not rely on field preemption to invalidate local em-
ployer-sanctions laws. Congress preempts an entire field of law when
its regulations are "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."a7 9 The
express language of IRCA's preemption provision and its legislative
history permit some room for states and municipalities to impose li-
censing penalties on employers who violate IRCA.1 80 That is why the
Lozano court had to go to great lengths to ignore the savings clause of
§ 1324a(h) (2), which permits some local regulation, in order to find
that the Hazleton ordinance was invalid on the basis of field preemp-
tion. 18 1 In Gray, the court correctly dismissed the field-preemption
175 See Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at * 11 ("[T]he law is clearly a similar law as its penalties
are limited to the suspension of a business license."). But see MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 1161 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "similar" as (1) "having characteristics
in common" and (2) "alike in substance or essentials"). Thus, using a plain-meaning ap-
proach to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2), one can infer that ordinances sharing com-
mon characteristics with licensing ordinances are valid. This does little to clarify the scope
of permissible regulation for courts and municipalities.
176 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519-20 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(resorting to legislative history to interpret IRCA's preemption clause); cf United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) ("[With a] straightforward statutory command, there is no
reason to resort to legislative history.").
177 See supra note 162.
178 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361-62 (1976) (discussing the Farm Labor Re-
gistration Act as evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws concerning
the licensing of farm-labor contractors).
179 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
180 See supra notes 33, 162 and accompanying text.
181 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 521-25 (analyzing the field-preemption claim without
discussing the savings clause of § 1324a(h) (2)).
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claim quickly by looking at Congress's intent to permit some level of
local regulation. 18 2
Professor Cristina M. Rodriguez has recently noted the dangers
of an expansive view of field preemption, which could undermine
state regulations in areas where there is a legitimate local interest. 83
Rodriguez advocates defining fields narrowly and with specificity. 18 4
This view is consistent with the language in De Canas, where the Court
held that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
render it a regulation of immigration."1 8 5 Thus, instead of framing
the field as immigration regulation, courts should look at the more
narrow question of whether the federal government has occupied the
field of licensing sanctions for employers of undocumented immi-
grants. The language of the statute and legislative history makes clear
that Congress's regulations are not "so pervasive as to make reasona-
ble the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it."186 In fact, Congress expressly left room for local
governments to supplement federal efforts.
C. Conflict Preemption
Courts should focus their preemption analysis on whether a chal-
lenged local employer-sanctions law conflicts with the law and policies
of the federal government. The Supreme Court has held that the
presence of a savings clause does not "create some kind of 'special
burden' beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emption principles.' '1 8 7
Therefore, courts should inquire whether the law "'stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress"' or whether it is "'impossible for a ... party to
comply with both state and federal requirements.' ,,188 Advocates of
local regulation argue that courts should not find preemption where
there is "any slight difference in approach between federal and state
182 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *13
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) ("Including a provision in the statute, as well as comments in the
legislative history, allowing some state licensing regulations to exist, clearly conflicts with
an intent to preempt the entire field of immigration regulation.").
183 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REv. 567, 623-24 (2008).
184 See id.
185 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
186 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also supra notes 33,
162 and accompanying text (discussing permissible forms of state regulations affecting
immigrants).
187 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000).
188 Id. at 899 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S.
280, 287 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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statutes. '18 9 However, the areas on which I propose courts focus their
analysis are not "slight difference[s]" but have the potential to
",stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment.., of the full pur-
poses"' of federal immigration policy by preventing uniform enforce-
ment of federal immigration law, overburdening businesses, and
encouraging discrimination.1 90 If local governments draft a regula-
tion that punishes businesses with a licensing penalty for employing
illegal workers in a manner consistent with federal law, as outlined
below, then courts should allow the local regulation to stand.
1. Employee-Verification Procedures
First, courts should consider whether the local law mandates the
use of an employment-verification system that is inconsistent with fed-
eral law. Federal law forbids the government from requiring most em-
ployers to participate in E-Verify.19 1 The federal employee-verification
system reflects a careful balance of burdens on employers, employees,
and the goal of deterring illegal immigration.1 92 Mandating participa-
tion in E-Verify undermines Congress's careful policy decisions.
Congress's decision to continue to make participation in E-Verify
voluntary reflects important and carefully considered policy deci-
sions. 193 Most importantly, work-authorized workers still frequently
receive tentative nonconfirmations from E-Verify resulting in substan-
tial costs to employers, employees, and the federal government.1 9 4 Al-
189 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 67 (arguing that the district court erred in
finding conflict preemption on the basis of slight variations between federal and local
laws).
190 Geier, 529 U.S. at 899 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
191 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-656 ("[With limited exceptions] the Attorney
General may not require any person or other entity to participate in a pilot program.").
An important exception is that all federal contractors are required to use E-Verify. Exec.
Order No. 13,465 § 1(b), 73 Fed. Reg. 33,285, (June 6, 2008), reprinted in 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. B41, B41-B42. However, this does not negate the fact that federal law bars
the Attorney General from requiring any entity, not enumerated by federal law, to partici-
pate in E-Verify.
192 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 52-56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5656-60 (discussing the history of the federal immigration legislation from the 1970s to
1985); see also Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991)
("[Tihe legislative history of section 1324a indicates that Congress intended to minimize
the burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process.").
193 See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIC PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.uscis.
gov/files/nativedocuments/BasicFINALcongress07O4.pdf ("Proponents have argued that
automating the process would make employment verification more effective in preventing
unauthorized employment and, consequently, would act as a deterrent to illegal immigra-
tion to the United States. Opponents have raised concerns about potential negative im-
pacts of automated employment verification on discrimination and privacy.").
194 Id. at 3-4.
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though the error rate is fairly low for all employees, the error rate for
foreign-born citizens is significantly higher than the rate for U.S. citi-
zens. Between October 2004 and October 2007 the error rate for for-
eign-born citizens was approximately ten percent.195 A report
commissioned by the Department of Homeland Security has recog-
nized that E-Verify is not sufficiently accurate to meet the require-
ments of federal law.1 96
Allowing states and localities to impose their own employee sta-
tus-verification procedures would impose a burden on businesses that
substantially exceeds Congress's intentions.' 97 Moreover, a patchwork
system of potentially hundreds of different regulatory schemes would
defeat Congress's goal of uniform enforcement. 198 For example, a
corporation operating in all fifty states would be required to use E-
Verify in Arizona 99 and a state-created "Status Verification System" in
Utah.200 In Illinois, however, the employer would be prohibited from
using E-Verify, 201 and in Tennessee the employer would have to com-
ply with restrictions on the forms of documentation that the employer
could use to verify eligibility.20 2 These laws represent a small sample
195 WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION: REPORT TO U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC. 57 (2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/WebBasicPilot
RprtSept2007.pdf.
196 See id. at xxi (" [T] he database used for verification is still not sufficiently up to date
to meet the IIRIRA requirement for accurate verification, especially for naturalized citi-
zens.... [Manual review] is time consuming and can result in discrimination against work-
authorized foreign-born persons ....").
197 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
supra note 170, at 5-9 (discussing federal and local regulations for verifying worker-eligibil-
ity status).
198 SeeImmigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100
Stat. 3359, 3384 ("[Tlhe immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigor-
ously and uniformly... " (emphasis added)). For a summary of local legislation regulating
employment of undocumented workers, see DiRK HEGEN, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT,
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLArION RELATED TO
IMMI RANTS AND IMMIGRATION 7-10 (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/
2007Immigrationfinal.pdf.
199 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (2008) ("[E]very employer .. .shall verify the
employment eligibility of the employee through the e-verify program.").
200 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-1 1-103 (2) (a) (2008) ("Each public employer shall register
with and use a Status Verification System to verify the federal employment authorization
status of a new employee.").
201 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/12(a) (2008) ("Employers are prohibited from en-
rolling in any Employment Eligibility Verification System, including the Basic Pilot pro-
gram .... until the Social Security Administration (SSA) and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) databases are able to make a determination on 99% of the tentative non-
confirmation notices issued to employers within 3 days, unless otherwise required by fed-
eral law.").
202 TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-106(b) (2008) ("For purposes of an application or offer of
employment, no person in this state shall accept an individual taxpayer identification num-
ber as a form of identification.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of the inconsistent procedures that businesses face despite Congress's
intention to create a uniform system for employee verification.
Local legislation mandating the use of E-Verify is not protected
under the doctrine of concurrent enforcement. The Gray court re-
jected an argument that mandatory use of E-Verify conflicted with fed-
eral law because "a state has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
government to enforce federal laws." 20 3 The City of Hazleton argued
that the trial court invented an "excessive enforcement" theory in de-
ciding that mandatory E-Verify was conflict preempted. 204 However,
local laws conflict with federal law not because they "excessive [ly]" en-
force immigration laws, but rather because they often ignore Con-
gress's goals of avoiding undue burdens on business and preventing
discrimination. 20 5 Further, a conflict in procedures used to reach the
same goal can be sufficient for federal law to preempt a local law. 20 6
Given local governments' limited resources, the federal govern-
ment is in a better position than local governments to monitor the
effectiveness of the E-Verify program and determine when to make it
mandatory on a nationwide basis. In fact, the federal government has
not hesitated to escalate use of the program when appropriate. 20 7
Courts should find that IRCA preempts a local law that mandates par-
ticipation in E-Verify.
2. Scope of Regulation
Second, courts should consider whether a local law applies to the
same employment activities that Congress intended to regulate. IRCA
makes it unlawful "to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employ-
ment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unautho-
rized alien . . . with respect to such employment."20 8 Regulations
203 Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *19
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (citing Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir.
1983)).
204 Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 65-66 ("According to the Court, while Con-
gress would like to see federal law fully enforced at the border, Congress does not wish to see
federal law fully enforced in the interior. Doing so would result in what the Court termed
excessive enforcement.'").
205 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) ("[W]here the federal govern-
ment ... has enacted a complete scheme of regulation .... states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress .... enforce additional or auxiliary regulations."). For a
discussion of Congress's goal of preventing discrimination, see infra notes 217-18 and ac-
companying text.
206 See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971) ("Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to
the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy.").
207 See Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156,
§§ 2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944 (extending the program from six to eleven years and requiring the
submission of a report about expanding the program to all fifty states).
208 INA § 274A(a) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (A) (2006).
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promulgated pursuant to IRCA exclude independent contractors and
casual domestic workers from the definition of the term "em-
ployee. ' 20 9 Moreover, Congress expressed an intention that the INS
should be flexible in sanctioning certain categories of employers. 210
Finally, the federal government has determined that unions should
not face liability under the employer-sanctions provisions of IRCA.211
A local regulation that penalizes employers of independent con-
tractors and casual domestic workers would conflict with a federal de-
termination not to impose employer sanctions in this context.212
Imposing additional liability by regulating employment of indepen-
dent contractors and casual domestic workers would impose a heavier
burden on employers than Congress expressly intended to impose. 213
Although an employer may be liable if he hires an independent con-
tractor knowing that the contractor has no work authorization, there
is no affirmative duty to verify an independent contractor's eligibil-
ity.2 14 Similarly, courts should inquire whether a local law would apply
to unions and organizations that recruit without receiving a fee. A
court should hold that IRCA preempts any local employer-sanctions
law that deviates from the federal definition of the term "employee."
Requiring federal adjudication of an IRCA violation should result in
increased local compliance with the numerous exceptions that Con-
gress has explicitly carved out as well as greater local restraint in those
situations where Congress has suggested that the INS should enforce
IRCA with greater discretion.
3. Enforcement Procedures
Third, courts should consider whether the procedures of a local
regulation are compatible with the procedures of federal employer-
sanctions provisions. For example, an employee has eight days to
209 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1 (f) (2008) ("The term employee means an individual who provides
services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration but does not mean
independent contractors . . . or those engaged in casual domestic employment.").
210 See H.R. REp. No. 99-682(I), at 57 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661
("The Committee recognizes the special problems facing professional sports and does not
intend that sanctions would be applicable in the case of technical violations caused by
exigent circumstances or processing delays.").
211 See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1 (d) ("The term refer for a fee... does not include union hiring
halls that refer union members or non-union individuals who pay union membership
dues."); id. § 274a.l(e) (excluding union hiring halls from being included in the phrase
"recruit for a fee").
212 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 57, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5661 ("It is not
the intent of this Committee that sanctions would apply in the case of casual hires .... ,).
213 See id. at 5656-60 (discussing the history of the federal immigration legislation
from the 1970s to 1985); see also Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. INS, 948 F.2d 549,554 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("[T]he legislative history of section 1324a indicates that Congress intended to
minimize the burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process.").
214 See INA § 274A(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(4) (2006).
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challenge a tentative nonconfirmation from the E-Verify system. 215
Local regulations requiring an employer to discharge an employee
before the eight-day period has elapsed conflict with federal proce-
dures and place employers in the precarious position of deciding
which law to follow. Although one court has avoided this problem by
tortuously reading a local ordinance to harmonize it with federal pro-
cedure,216 such an approach is unrealistic because few employers
faced with a tentative nonconfirmation would risk their business li-
cense by inferring an extended waiting period from a local ordinance
that does not expressly include such an extension. Local ordinances
that create varying procedures raise the potential problem of impos-
ing liability on employers regardless of their course of action. Thus,
local laws should make clear that employers relying on an E-Verify
system may not terminate an employee until after a cure period pursu-
ant to federal law, and courts should hold that federal law preempts a
local ordinance that does not explicitly follow federal procedures.
Once again, if a local ordinance requires a federally adjudicated deci-
sion, this conflict should not occur.
4. Antidiscrimination Provisions
Fourth, courts should consider whether a local law upsets IRCA's
balance of employer sanctions and antidiscrimination provisions.
Congress, when enacting employer-sanctions provisions, also enacted
a comprehensive scheme of legislation to prevent discrimination
based on national origin or citizenship status against applicants. 217
Congress expressed concern about the potential for discrimination re-
sulting from the employer sanctions and stated that antidiscrimina-
tion provisions were essential to IRCA. 218 Thus, local legislators must
balance any legislation sanctioning employers with protections for mi-
norities that may face discrimination as a result.
Some local ordinances have upset this careful balance by not only
failing to include antidiscrimination provisions, but also by actually
fostering discrimination. Discriminatory acts in Hazleton are well
documented: Latino residents received mail referring to them as "sub-
215 Pilot Programs for Employment Eligibility Confirmation, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,309,
48,312 (Sept. 15, 1997).
216 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *17
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) ("In the event that the Basic Pilot program reports back a tenta-
tive noncomfirmation, then the Ordinance's three day time table is tolled, pending com-
pletion of the federal determination, which allows the employee eight federal government
business days to respond to the nonconfirmation.").
217 See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.
218 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5672 ("[T]he
Committee does believe that every effort must be taken to minimize the potentiality of
discrimination and that a mechanism to remedy any discrimination that does occur must
be a part of this legislation." (emphasis added)).
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human spic scum."2 1 9 Moreover, the anti-Latino sentiments have hurt
businesses in full compliance with the law. For example, a Latina busi-
nesswoman in Hazleton was forced to close her store because the ordi-
nance decreased business.220 In addition, some municipalities appear
to have enacted ordinances with a discriminatory intent revealed by
the statements of public officials 221 and the statements of advocates of
local regulation. 222
The procedures of local regulations are often more likely to facili-
tate discrimination than the federal employer-sanction provisions in
IRCA. For example, the Hazleton ordinance permits any city resident
to file a complaint. 223 Residents could easily use these ordinances as a
tool for harassing minorities. Further, the parties enforcing local reg-
ulations-employers, citizens, and local police-have less training in
immigration law than federal authorities and are more likely to resort
to proxies-such as race or ethnicity-to determine an individual's
immigration status. For example, local police picked up residents
with a "Mexican appearance" during raids in Chandler, Arizona. 224
Municipal ordinances must provide proportionate safeguards
against discrimination in order not to conflict with federal law prohib-
iting discrimination. If municipalities choose to impose licensing pen-
alties following the procedures of § 1324a, they should also provide
protections to minority employees comparable to those in § 1324b.
Further, the municipalities should provide training to local law en-
forcement in how to enforce the regulations without discriminating
against minorities and immigrants. Local governments should also
provide employers with guidance on how to comply properly with the
regulations without discriminating against lawful workers.
If municipalities enact a licensing ordinance that complies with
federal law as outlined above, courts should reject an argument that
the imposition of a licensing penalty conflicts with federal law. Chal-
lengers might claim that these ordinances conflict with Congress's in-
tention to create a uniform system of employer sanctions by imposing
219 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
220 Id. at 490.
221 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
223 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4.B(1) (Sept. 8,2006), available at http://www.
aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazletonsecondordinance.pdf. Although section 4.B(2) pro-
vides that any complaint on the basis of race shall be invalid, there is no requirement that
the complaint state more than the alleged violator, date, location, and violation. Id. A
biased complaint would probably not state that it was filed on the basis of race. Thus,
section 4.B(2) is not sufficient to prevent discriminatory abuse of the complaint proce-
dures of section 4.B(1).
224 See Mary Romero & Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting from INS
and Local Police's Use of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in
Arizona, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 75, 83-84 (2005).
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inconsistent penalties depending on the jurisdiction. Although such
inconsistency might make local employer sanctions bad public policy,
it does not make them invalid. The strongest evidence of Congress's
preemptive intent is the explicit language of the preemption stat-
ute,2 2 5 and Congress chose to exempt local licensing regulations from
IRCA's preemption provision. However, when congressional commit-
tees return to immigration legislation, they should reconsider whether
this provision is sound policy. To truly create a uniform employer-
sanctions enforcement mechanism, Congress would have to preempt
all local regulations penalizing employers for employing unauthorized
workers and provide for effective enforcement of IRCA's provisions.
V
LoCAL HOUSING-SANCTIONS LAws AND FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION POLICY
A court's analysis of housing sanctions, like its analysis of em-
ployer sanctions, should focus on conflicts with federal law and policy.
There is no express preemption provision to rely on in analyzing these
ordinances,226 so courts must focus on implied preemption. As dis-
cussed above, courts should not rely on a field-preemption theory to
strike down local immigration ordinances: courts could only accom-
plish this with an overly expansive field definition that would result in
localities' losing the ability to regulate in a wide variety of areas in
which they have a strong interest.227 Moreover, courts should not rely
on a regulation-of-immigration preemption theory because such a the-
ory is not based on an accurate construction of the first De Canas
test.
2 2 8
A. Regulation-of-Immigration Preemption
Courts should not rely on the first De Canas test-whether a local
law is a regulation of immigration-to preempt local housing laws.
This is, however, the approach a federal court in Texas took to strike
down the Farmers Branch ordinance. 2 29 De Canas, in contrast, em-
phasized the narrow scope of this test, noting that an immigration
regulation "is essentially a determination of who should or should not
be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
225 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002).
226 See INA § 274A(h) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (2) (2006) (preempting only local em-
ployer sanctions).
227 See Rodriguez, supra note 183; supra Part IV.B.
228 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1976).
229 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 869
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that an ordinance is a regulation of immigration because it
adopts HUD regulations to determine immigration status).
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entrant may remain."230 Furthermore, in De Canas, the Court consid-
ered whether a state law was overinclusive and barred lawful workers
from employment under its third test-conflict preemption. 23' Un-
fortunately, in later cases, the Supreme Court has not been so precise
with its language and has indicated some support for the proposition
that a local redefinition of immigration standards is preempted as an
immigration regulation rather than a conflict. 232 This difference is
not merely semantic. Like an overly expansive definition of field pre-
emption, an overly expansive view of what constitutes immigration
regulation could lead to the federal immigration power preempting a
wide variety of local legislation, such as sanctuary laws and day-labor
centers. 233 A conflict-based analysis allows a court to look at the fea-
tures of specific legislation to determine its viability rather than invali-
dating a large range of local legislation as regulations of immigration.
B. Conflict Preemption
Courts should rely on conflicts with federal law and policy to
strike down local housing regulations without announcing sweeping
doctrines that would excessively impair localities' regulatory func-
tions. Ordinances that penalize property owners for leasing property
to undocumented immigrants might conflict with federal law by deny-
ing access to housing to persons lawfully within the United States or
by requiring local officials to make decisions outside of their jurisdic-
tion such as determining an individual's immigration status. Regard-
less of how well a municipality attempts to draft a housing ordinance,
it will conflict with federal law because it serves as a proxy for the
federal government's exclusive power of deportation.
Advocates of local regulation argue that housing ordinances are
concurrent enforcement of federal harboring provisions.2 34 To sup-
port this assertion, Hazleton relied on a Ninth Circuit decision for the
proposition that "the provision of an apartment... to illegal aliens fits
230 424 U.S. at 355.
231 See id. at 364 ("[O]n its face, § 2805 (a) would apply to such [lawful] aliens and
thus unconstitutionally conflict with federal law.").
232 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) ("The States enjoy no power with respect
to the classification of aliens. This power is 'committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
(1976))).
233 See Rodriguez, supra note 183, at 609.
234 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 59; see also INA § 274(a)(1)(A) (iii), 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (A) (iii) (2006) (imposing criminal penalties on anyone who "knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the
United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts
to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any build-
ing or any means of transportation").
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
squarely within the federal crime of harboring."23 5 However, this con-
clusory assertion does not withstand careful analysis. The Ninth Cir-
cuit decision involved not only the provision of an apartment but also
a deliberate attempt to conceal the presence of undocumented immi-
grants by instructing them to lie to immigration officials and tear up
documents from border patrol.236 In fact, the Ninth Circuit later clar-
ified that harboring requires an intent to violate the law, which can be
shown by actions that serve to avoid the alien's detection by immigra-
tion authorities. 237 Even assuming that local governments are seeking
the same end as the federal government, they may not claim that they
are merely concurrently enforcing federal immigration law if they use
significantly different means to reach that end.238 The doctrine of
concurrent enforcement is not a sufficient justification for local ordi-
nances penalizing landlords who lease property to undocumented
immigrants.
1. Access to Housing for Lawful Immigrants
First, courts should analyze whether a local housing ordinance
would deny access to housing to immigrants who are lawfully in the
United States. Any ordinance that penalizes landlords for leasing
property to undocumented immigrants must use federal law to deter-
mine an individual's immigration status. Deviation from federal stan-
dards can lead to a situation in which aliens lawfully in the United
States are excluded from housing under local law. 23 9 If an ordinance
has the potential to exclude lawful aliens from housing, federal law
preempts the ordinance because housing provisions conflict with fed-
eral law if they result in excessive burdens to lawful immigrants. 240
For example, a court noted that the Farmers Branch ordinance would
exclude alien students, tourists, and diplomats from housing.241
235 Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 59 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d
662, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1989)).
236 See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 689.
237 See United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States
v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring evidence that the defendant hid
the undocumented immigrant from detection for a finding of harboring).
238 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000) ("'[C]onflict is
imminent' when 'two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity."' (quot-
ing Wis. Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
239 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 869
(N.D. Tex. 2008).
240 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) ("[States] can
neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states. State laws
which impose discriminatory burdens upon the .. .residence of aliens lawfully within the
United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigra-
tion, and have accordingly been held invalid.").
241 See Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
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Housing provisions that deny legal immigrants access to housing con-
flict with federal law because they place a "discriminatory burden[ ]
upon the ... residence of aliens lawfully within the United States." 2 42
2. Determination of Immigration Status
Second, courts should analyze whether a housing ordinance con-
flicts with federal law by requiring state or local officials to determine
a housing applicant's immigration status. Local officials may not rely
on E-Verify or other databases because their function is to determine
worker eligibility or other statuses, not whether an immigrant may law-
fully remain in the country.2 43 Further, local officials lack the jurisdic-
tion to determine whether an immigrant is lawfully in the country or
whether the government must remove her.2 44 Federal courts have
held that federal law preempts legislation that permits local authori-
ties to determine immigration status. 245 One court determined that a
local housing ordinance "deputizes . . . private individuals as federal
immigration officials and takes a federal function away from the fed-
eral government."246 Further, an ordinance that imposes a sanction
on a property owner for leasing property to an undocumented immi-
grant has the effect of making the landlord decide the immigration
status of a prospective tenant.24 7 If local officials desire to assist fed-
eral officials, they must follow the procedures laid out in federal law:
creating an agreement pursuant to INA § 28 7 (g) .248 Therefore, a fed-
eral official must determine immigration status, and if local officials
would like to enforce immigration regulations, enforcement must be
242 Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419.
243 See supra Part IV.C.I.
244 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (1) (2006) ("An immigration judge shall conduct proceed-
ings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien."), id. § 1229a(a) (3)
("[These proceedings are] the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an
alien may be ... removed from the United States.").
245 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 770 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) ("[D]eterminations of immigration status by state agents amounts to immigra-
tion regulation . . . [when] made . . . for the limited purpose of denying benefits.").
246 Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
247 The comprehensive federal employer sanctions in INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a,
provide a safe harbor for employers who have complied in good faith with the employee-
verification requirements. See INA § 274A(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (3) (2006). Without
a similar provision, landlords would be responsible for assessing the validity of immigration
documents because they would be liable for accepting erroneous documentation. How-
ever, states neither have the ability to make immigration status determinations, League of
United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 770, nor the ability to require document collec-
tion, see Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419 (holding that states may not impose additional condi-
tions on the residence of aliens).
248 See INA § 2 8 7(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1 357(g)(1) (2006) ("[T]he Attorney General may
enter into a written agreement with a State,... pursuant to which an officer or employee
of the State . . . may carry out [an investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens] ... at the expense of the State ... and to the extent consistent with State and local
law.").
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through an agreement with the Attorney General that is compliant
with INA § 28 7 (g).
3. Proxy for Deportation
Third, housing provisions conflict with federal law when they at-
tempt to deny shelter to undocumented immigrants as a proxy for
deportation-an exclusively federal power.249 The effect of such an
ordinance is to exclude undocumented immigrants from a commu-
nity, to "deport" them to neighboring communities. It often may take
years for the federal government to determine whether it should de-
port an undocumented immigrant. The federal government permits
many immigrants who enter the United States unlawfully to stay, and
it would conflict with federal policy to attempt to undermine the fed-
eral government's decision by denying housing to immigrants the fed-
eral government has not decided to deport.2 50
CONCLUSION
Well over two years since the Hazleton Council enacted the first
ordinance on August 15, 2006,251 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
heard oral arguments on the validity of Hazleton's regulations. 252
During this period, the courts have seen extensive litigation on the
subject of local ordinances regulating the employment of unautho-
rized workers and have reached contradictory results. Courts have re-
acted by using the preemption doctrine to reach their desired result
of either upholding or invalidating a local ordinance. There has been
less litigation concerning ordinances that regulate housing of undocu-
mented immigrants. Although the courts to consider the issue have
struck down these ordinances, they have used different legal theories
to invalidate them.
Courts should recognize that Congress expressed an intention to
allow states and municipalities to enact licensing regulations and fit-
ness-to-do-business laws that penalize employers found guilty of em-
ploying unauthorized workers. Even so, federal law expressly
preempts any regulations that impose a monetary or civil penalty.
Courts should not rely on the field-preemption theory because Con-
gress has explicitly left some room for local regulation. Rather, courts
should carefully inspect an ordinance and focus on whether it under-
249 See supra note 244.
250 See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
251 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.
org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton firstordinance.pdf.
252 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Federal Court of Appeals Hears Argu-
ments on Hazleton Anti-immigrant Law (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants/discrim/37597prs20081030.html.
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mines federal immigration policy. If states and localities craft legisla-
tion that conforms to federal laws and procedures, they may then
choose to impose a licensing penalty in addition to the civil and crimi-
nal penalties imposed by IRCA. Furthermore, courts should strike
down housing ordinances because they serve as a proxy for deporta-
tion and thus conflict with the federal government's exclusive author-
ity to order deportation.
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